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We combine data from the Latin American Migration Project and the Mexican Migration Project to estimate models predicting
the likelihood of taking of first and later trips to the United States from five nations: Mexico, the Dominican Republic, Costa Rica,
Nicaragua, and Peru. The models test specific hypotheses about the effects of social capital on international migration and how
these effects vary with respect to contextual factors. Our findings confirm the ubiquity of migrant networks and the universality of
social capital effects throughout Latin America. They also reveal how the sizes of these effects are not uniform across settings. Social
capital operates more powerfully on first as opposed to later trips and interacts with the cost of migration. In addition, effects are
somewhat different when considering individual social capital (measuring strong ties) and community social capital (measuring
weak ties). On first trips, the effect of strong ties in promoting migration increases with distance whereas the effect of weak ties
decreases with distance. On later trips, the direction of effects for both individual and community social capital is negative for long
distances but positive for short distances.
1. Introduction
Research over the past two decades has established the
centrality of social networks to the process of international
migration. As social beings, humans are inevitably enmeshed
in webs of strong ties to close friends and relatives and
weak ties to more distant relatives, casual acquaintances, and
friends of friends. The set of weak and strong ties to people
with current or prior migratory experience constitutes a per-
son’s migrant network. Whenever an aspiring international
migrant has a social tie to someone with prior migratory
experience, that connection offers a potentially valuable
source of social capital. By drawing on the tie, individuals can
mobilize social capital embedded within it to gain access to
valuable information, moral support, and material assistance
that may reduce, often quite substantially, the costs and
risks of international migration. As a result, people who
have migrant friends and relatives display a much higher
likelihood of migrating compared with those who do not.
The foregoing summary of network effects is consistent
with the theory of social capital and has been confirmed
in numerous empirical studies (for reviews, see [1, 2]).
Although scholars generally agree that migrant networks
have strong effects on patterns and processes of migration,
this conclusion does not mean that other factors such
as human capital, material assets, political conflict, civil
violence, and even the distribution of social capital across
transit locations are not also important [3–5]. Nonetheless,
the existence and importance of network effects have been
documented in migratory systems throughout the world.
Few studies have undertaken a direct comparison of the
how network ties work across multiple settings. Studies based
on data from the MexicanMigration Project have established
a variety of findings: that having a social tie to a current
or former U.S. migrant dramatically increases the odds of
emigration [6–8], that the size of this effect varies with
the strength of the tie and the closeness of the relationship
[9], that network effects differ by gender [10–13], that
the power of network ties to promote migration is a real
causal effect and not spurious or attributable to unmeasured
heterogeneity [14, 15] and that networks and the social
capital they produce are fundamental to the cumulative
causation of migration [16, 17]. These studies have been
replicated as well in other regions. Curran and colleagues
[18] studied the effects of network composition on internal
migration in Thailand and concluded that household-based
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migrant networks (strong ties) were more influential than
village-level migrant networks (weak ties) in promoting out-
migration.
Despite the theoretical and substantive contributions of
these studies, the fact remains that most of them are based
on just one case—Mexico—and a rather special one at that.
No other developing country shares a 2,000 mile border
with an advanced industrial nation, is linked to it through
a comprehensive free trade agreement, has a century-long
history of significant cross-border movement, and has expe-
rienced such extensive political and economic penetration
from its developed neighbor. As a result, in concluding
their comprehensive review of the North American research
literature, Massey et al. [1] argued that “far too much of the
research is centered in Mexico, which because of its unique
relationship to the USA may be unrepresentative of broader
patterns and trends.”
In order to address the relative lack of comparative
research on international migration, Donato et al. [19]
undertook a systematic assessment of international migra-
tion from a variety of countries in Latin America and the
Caribbean, assembling a series of comparable empirical stud-
ies based on data taken from both the Latin AmericanMigra-
tion Project and the Mexican Migration Project. In terms of
social capital, Alvarado and Massey [20] found that the odds
of migrating to the United States from Mexico, Costa Rica,
and Guatemala were all strongly increased by having a family
tie to a U.S. resident. Fussell [21] likewise found that having
a parent or sibling with U.S. experience greatly increased
the probability of taking a first U.S. trip among residents
of Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Mexico, Nicaragua,
and Puerto Rico. She also found that a rising prevalence
of migrants in the community strongly increased the odds
of departure, in Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, and
Mexico. Takenaka and Pren [22] found that the likelihood
of migrating to the United States from Peru was strongly
related to migratory prevalence in the community as well as
to the existence of ties to migrant family members, a finding
replicated by Massey and Riosmena [23] in samples from
Mexico, the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica.
Although the analysis by Fussell [21] focused specifically
on the effects of social capital, the other studies in the
Donato et al. generally considered the influence of other
variables of theoretical and substantive interest and simply
used measures of social capital as controls. The purpose of
this paper is twofold. First, we seek to assess the importance
of both individual- and community-level measures of social
capital as determinants of international migration relative to
other forms of capital. Second, we seek to understand inter-
country differences in the relative importance of various
measures of human and social capital in predicting interna-
tional migration and to assess how effects differ with respect
to the costs of migration.
2. Social Capital andMigration
Building in prior work, we specify four indicators of in-
dividual social capital and one measure of community social
capital. Individual social capital refers to migration-enhanc-
ing resources that come from direct, personal, and usually
close ties to particular people with migratory experience
in the United States. Community social capital refers to
resources emanating from weaker ties to U.S. migrants
diffused throughout a community—casual friends, acquain-
tances, distant relatives, and friends of friends who have been
to the United States. In a sense, individual social capital refers
to strong ties and community social capital to weak ties, and
both sets of ties constitute important sources of instrumental
value for people contemplating a trip to the United States, as
confirmed in quantitative as well as qualitative studies [24].
Community social capital is measured by the migration
prevalence ratio—the proportion of persons aged 15+ in
the community who have ever been to the United States
by year t, developed originally by Massey et al. [16]. With
respect to individual social capital, Fussell [21], Takenaka
and Pren [22], and Massey and Riosmena [23] found that
ties to different migrant relatives had different effects across
national settings, so we measure individual social capital
using four separate dichotomous indicators: whether one of
the subject’s parents had migrated by year t, whether any
siblings had migrated by year t, whether the spouse had
migrated by year t, and whether any of the subject’s children
had migrated by year t.
Prior work also suggests that the migratory effects of
social capital vary by gender within and across countries
[10, 12, 13, 25]. In order to simplify the analysis and restrict
the number of interactions to be modeled statistically, we,
therefore, confined our attention to the migratory behavior
of male household heads. In addition to varying by gender,
prior work also suggests that social capital effects are not
uniform across communities (Garip [26]). Individual social
capital generally has stronger effects on out-migration in
rural than urban areas [27, 28], and the mechanisms of
cumulative causation likewise operate more powerfully in
rural than in urban areas [29]. Cumulative causation also
operates more effectively when social capital is equally
distributed among members of a community [30] and when
the migration in question is unauthorized rather than legal
[21]. Here models estimated to predict the likelihood of
taking a first U.S. trip are limited to those migrating without
legal documents and all models control for community size.
We control for the differential access of people to migrant
networks by considering multiple indicators of social capital
at the individual level.
Our primary interest here concerns interactions between
social capital and two factors of theoretical interest that vary
systematically across settings. First, we hypothesize that the
relative influence of social capital varies depending on a
person’s prior migratory experience (see [8, 31]). First-time
migrants, by definition, have no direct knowledge of the
host society and are crucially dependent on assistance from
others to lower their costs and risks. Once in the United
States, however, migrants begin to accumulate their own
information about how to enter the country, look for work,
stay out of trouble, and generally navigate U.S. culture and
society. Across successive trips, therefore, migrants tend to
substitute their own migration-specific human capital for
social capital in managing migration. We, thus, expect social
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capital to have stronger effects on the likelihood of making a
first trip than on the probability of making additional trips,
which we test by estimating separate models for first and later
trips.
Second, we hypothesize an interaction between social
capital and the difficulty or cost of making the trip. The
higher the cost and the more significant the barriers to inter-
national movement, the more we expect migrants to rely on
social capital to gain entry and find work in a foreign country.
Conversely, the lower the cost of international movement,
the less necessary and less valuable social capital will be for
potential migrants contemplating an international trip. We
test this hypothesis by including cost-capital interactions in
equations predicting first and later trips, using distance to
destination as a proxy for the cost of migration. Given the
focus of prior research on Mexico, this interaction has not
been well investigated to date.
Combining the MMP and LAMP data sets yields con-
siderable cross-country variation in the costs, risks, and
difficulty of migrating to the United States. Although both
the MMP and LAMP surveys asked the cost of hiring a
border crossing guide and asked respondents to estimate
the total costs of making the trip, we found that outside of
Mexico, a majority of trips were made without coyotes and
that trip costs were unreliably reported and contained much
missing data. At the suggestion of reviewers, therefore, we
decided to use the distance between sending and destination
communities to proxy the cost of migration. For each
migrant, we determined the distance in kilometers between
the community of origin and the community of destination.
For nonmigrants, we computed potential distance as the
average distance to destinations reported by migrants from
the same community. For example, if half a community’s
migrants went to Los Angeles and half went to New York, the
potential distance for a nonmigrant contemplating a trip to
the United States would be the average of the two distances.
3. Other Forms of Capital
Whereas scientific interest in social capital is largely a product
of the 1980s, interest in the influence of human and financial
capital on migration is older. Sjaastad [32] was the first
to theorize human migration in terms of human capital,
but the canonical formulation of the neoclassical migration
model is that of Todaro [33]. In neoclassical economic terms,
migrants are hypothesized to move in order to maximize the
financial returns to education, training, skills, and abilities
by moving from a low-wage to a high-wage (in this case,
foreign) labor market. Recent research suggests that different
forms of social capital (e.g., strong and weak ties) and
different forms of human capital (e.g., a high school diploma
versus a GED) play distinctive roles in determining social
outcomes [34, 35]. Our research explores how social capital
and human capital interact with the costs of migration to
determine the likelihood of international migration.
A priori, the direction of the effect of human capital
on the odds of migration between any two countries is
indeterminate. One first needs to know how the respective
rates of return to human capital at origin and destination
and the costs of international movement [1]. In highly
unequal societies such as those in Latin America, where
education is a scarce, even modest levels of schooling are
rewarded in domestic labor markets but are rewarded little
internationally, producing a negative selection with respect
to human capital. Both Taylor [36] and Massey and Espinosa
[8], for example, have documented the negative selectivity of
Mexican migrants with respect to education (using different
data sets). Whatever the nature of the selectivity, however,
one thing is clear: the higher the costs and barriers to
international movement, the more selected with respect to
human capital are those who do choose to migrate. Thus,
we hypothesize a significant interaction between the cost of
migration and indicators of individual human capital.
In contrast, as already noted, we predict a substitution
between social capital and migration-specific human capital,
where the latter is defined as the knowledge, experience,
and resources acquired by people in the course of migration
itself. We test this hypothesis by estimating separate
equations to predict departure on first and later trips and
include indicators of migration-specific human capital in
the latter, hypothesizing that they will absorb a share of the
variance formerly accounted for by indicators of individual
and community social capital, thus reducing the size of
coefficients associated with them. On later trips, we measure
migration-specific human capital using three indicators:
the number of U.S. trips made by the respondent through
year t, total U.S. experience accumulated through year t,
and whether or not residence documents had been acquired
by year t. For most international migrants, documents are
attained through connections made while in the United
States. Although in a few instances migrants leave on a
first trip in documented status, this occurs mostly for sons,
daughters, and spouses of legal immigrants, and since our
models are estimated for male household heads, very few
began migrating legally and the effect of documentation
thus is not readily estimable in predicting initial U.S. trips,
leading us to analyze only undocumented a first trips but to
include an indicator of documentation for later trips.
Financial capital also plays a role in neoclassical eco-
nomic thinking about international migration. Although we
cannot measure financial capital per se using MMP and
LAMP data, we can measure the ownership of financial
assets such as land, housing, and business enterprises, which
we label physical capital. Like human capital, the effect of
immobile physical assets on out-migration is indeterminate
under neoclassical theory. On the one hand, assets can pro-
vide income or collateral for loans to finance a trip abroad.
On the other hand, if the potential income from assets is
significant, it may reduce the attractiveness of international
migration. In general, research from around the world finds
that migrants come from somewhere in the middle of the
wealth distribution—rich enough to be able to finance a trip
but poor enough to have unsatisfied ambitions at home [1].
A more recent avenue of economic theorizing, however,
views assets in a different way. The new economics of labor
migration argues that international migration may not only
be undertaken to maximize earnings, but also to over come
failures in capital and credit markets [37]. Because these
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markets are nonexistent, poorly functioning, or inefficient
in many developing countries, people are unable to finance
agricultural production, the purchase of large consumption
items (such as housing), or the establishment of a business
enterprise.
In terms of the assets considered here, already owning a
home indicates the lack of a major motivation for migration
(the need to self-finance home acquisition) and is thus
hypothesized to be negatively related to the odds of out-
migration. Around the world, the most important single use
of migrant remittances is the acquisition or improvement
of homes [1], and studies in Mexico have generally found
home ownership to be negatively related to international
migration [8]. In similar fashion, owning a business signifies
the lack of a need for investment capital and also provides
an additional source of earnings to reduce the net gain from
emigration, lending it a negative influence on the probability
of international movement.
The same might be said of land, except that land often
requires significant ongoing investment to make production
profitable in a market economy. During the 1940s, for
example, Mexican authorities redistributed land to peasants
but did not provide them with financial assistance to
undertake production, generating a demand for investment
capital that was met by migrating to the United States
[6]. To the extent that a similar situation prevails in other
Latin American settings—with households owning land but
lacking the financial means to make it maximally productive
in a market economy—we would expect land ownership to
exert a similarly positive effect on the odds of out-migration.
4. Source of Data
Cross-national research to date has been limited by the
lack of comparable and reliable data for different countries.
Fortunately, the Latin American Migration Project (LAMP)
was modeled on the Mexican Migration Project (MMP)
specifically to address this limitation by compiling equivalent
data sets using comparable questionnaires and similar data
collection methods across a range of countries in Latin
America and the Caribbean. Here, we take advantage of
LAMP data to compare the relative importance of network
ties in determining first and later trips to the United
States from Mexico, the Dominican Republic, Costa Rica,
Nicaragua, and Peru.
The MMP began in 1982 and since 1987 has annually
surveyed communities throughout Mexico to build a com-
prehensive data base on documented and undocumented
migration to the United States. Its procedures and the
resulting data have been well-described in numerous pub-
lications (see [38–41]). In brief, each year 4–6 communities
ranging in size from small villages to neighborhoods in large
metropolitan areas are selected and surveyed using simple
random sampling methods. Within each community, a semi-
structured interview known as an ethnosurvey is applied
to gather social, demographic, and economic information
about each household and all of its members. A special
module collects information on the first and last trips made
by each member to the United States, and all household
heads and spouses are administered a retrospective ques-
tionnaire that compiles a complete history of migration and
border-crossing from age 15 (or age of entry into the labor
force) onward. MMP questionnaires and a description of the
sample and data sets are available from the project’s website
at http://mmp.opr.princeton.edu/.
Each Mexican community survey is followed a few
months later by a survey of out-migrants originating in
that community who have settled in the United States and
no longer return regularly to be interviewed there. These
respondents are located using snowball methods, also known
as chain-referral and network-driven sampling methods.
Data from the U.S. and Mexican surveys are then cleaned,
coded, and assembled into composite files that are repre-
sentative of the binational population of migrants formed
through recurrent processes of migration and settlement
in the United States (see Massey and Zenteno [39]) for a
demonstration of the data’s representativeness).
The LAMP was launched in 1998 as a self-conscious
attempt to replicate the design and methods of the Mexican
Migration Project. As with the MMP, communities of
various sizes are selected and surveyed using semistructured
questionnaires and simple random sampling methods, and
each sending community sample is followed by a survey of
migrants located in U.S. destination areas using snowball
sampling techniques. Here, we make use of the surveys that
have been carried out in the Dominican Republic, Costa
Rica, Nicaragua, and Peru. Preliminary analyses of LAMP
data suggest they are valid and accurate and, like the MMP
data, yield a valid picture of patterns and process of both
documented and undocumented migration to the United
States (see [42]).
Whereas the MMP used the exactly the same survey
instrument at all field sites, total consistency was not possible
in the LAMP. Geographic conditions, patterns of social
and economic organization, and variables of interest, such
as documentation, border crossing, and land tenure, differ
from country to country. As a result, there is no a single
“LAMP questionnaire” in the same way that there is a
uniform MMP questionnaire. Rather, LAMP investigators
developed a “Template questionnaire” that is adapted to
each local situation to yield a standard body of data on
international migration. As with the MMP, the country-
specific questionnaires, full documentation, and a detailed
description of the data are available from the project website
at http://mmp.opr.princeton.edu/.
Sampling information for the MMP and LAMP surveys
used in this analysis are summarized in Table 1. Given its long
history, the sample compiled in Mexico by the MMP is by far
the largest and most extensive, containing 128 communities
with 21,474 households and 138,711 persons at the time we
carried out this research. The average Mexican community
was surveyed in 1997 with a sampling fraction of 14.3%
and a refusal rate of 7%. To represent the Caribbean, the
Dominican Republic was surveyed in 1999 with a sample
size 978 households and 5,913 persons, yielding a sampling
fraction of 13% and a refusal rate of 4%. To represent Central
America, Costa Rica and Nicaragua were sampled in 2002
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Table 1: Sampling information for surveys conducted in selected countries by the Latin American and Mexican Migration Projects.
Sampling information Mexico Dominican Republic Costa Rica Nicaragua Peru
Community samples
Number of communities 128 7 7 9 4
Number households 20,552 904 1,391 1,598 677
Sampling fraction 14.2 13.1 22.0 19.0 11.7
Refusal rate 7.4 4.3 3.6 4.3 38.4
U.S. samples
Number of households 922 74 37 65 48
Number of persons 4,930 370 168 303 170
Total sample
Number of households 21,474 978 1,428 1,789 725
Number of persons 138,711 5,913 7,414 11,168 3,742
Average survey year 1997 1999 2002 2002 2003
with respective sampling fractions of 22% and 19% and a
refusal rate of 4%, yielding corresponding totals of 1,428 and
1,789 households and 7,414 and 11,168 persons.
Only in Peru did LAMP interviewers experience sig-
nificant problems with respondent cooperation, yielding a
rather high refusal rate of 38%. Three of the four com-
munities surveyed were working class areas in metropolitan
Lima, where rates of crime and urban violence were high
and rising, causing much fear and a palpable reluctance
to talk to strangers. Whereas the refusal rate in the one
community surveyed outside of Lima was just 11%, within
themetropolitan area itself the rate ranged from 39% to 48%.
Although standard practice in both the MMP and LAMP
has been not to offer payments to respondents, in Lima, we
made an exception and purchased a basic pocket calculator
as a small gift for each household that agreed to participate.
The final sample size was 725 households and 3,572 persons,
achieved with a sampling fraction of 12%.
In this analysis, we draw upon data compiled from life
histories of male household heads to undertake a discrete-
time event history analysis. Following Massey and Espinosa’s
[8] study of migration from Mexico, we undertake separate
analyses to model the likelihood of taking a first U.S. trip and
then move on to model the process of taking an additional
trip given that one has already occurred. For the analysis of
first trips, we follow each male head year by year from age
15 to the survey date and assess whether the person left for
the United States as an undocumented migrant in that year.
Undocumented migrants are those who crossed the border
without authorization or who entered with a short-term visa
and then violated its terms by working or staying too long.
Following Massey and Espinosa, we only consider person
years lived since 1965 to limit recall error. Each year in which
the person did not migrate was coded 0 and the year in which
the first trip was taken was coded 1. All person years subse-
quent to the first trip are excluded to provide a detailed look
at the process by which international migration is initiated.
In order to study the process by which migration is
perpetuated, we follow each household head year by year
following a return from the United States up to the time
he leaves on the next trip, coding person years where no
trip was taken as 0 and ones where an additional trip was
made as 1 and keeping track of the number of prior trips
and the accumulated total of U.S. experience. This analysis
also includes people migrating in legal status, as a small
number of people have been able to acquire documentation
by virtue of their prior U.S. experience. This coding is
repeated for all intervals between trips up to the survey
date, at which point the data are censored. In all analyses—
for first as well as subsequent U.S. trips—independent
variables are measured in year t and the outcomes (dichoto-
mous indicators of migration) are measured in year t+1.
With the exception of fixed characteristics such as gender,
country, and community of origin, all variables are time
varying.
5. Access to Forms of Capital
Across Latin America
In Table 2, we show mean values of variables used in
our analysis of migration to the United States. With the
exception of measures of migration-specific human capital,
these figures assess the situation of male household heads in
the average person year lived prior to the first U.S. trip or the
survey date, whichever came first. Reflecting its location and
long history of migration to the United States, respondents
from Mexico are generally wealthiest in terms of individual
social capital (see top panel). Among Mexican heads, 6%
had a migrant parent, 15% a migrant sibling, 1% a migrant
spouse, and 6% a migrant child.
However, household heads from theDominican Republic
display only slightly less access to individual social capital,
reflecting the intensity of a migration stream that began in
the early 1960s when the U.S. ambassador began giving out
legal residence documents to politically active Dominicans to
get them out of the country and restore order [43]. In the
average person year under observation, 4% of Dominican
respondents had a migrant parent, 18% a migrant sibling,
1% a migrant spouse, and 5.5% a migrant child. In the
remaining nations, however, access to individual social
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Table 2: Variables used in the analysis of first out-migration from five origin contexts in Latin America.
Independent variables Mexico Dominican Republic Nicaragua Costa Rica Peru
Forms of capital
Individual social capital
Parent a U.S. migrant 0.063 0.039 0.007 0.007 0.010
U.S. migrant siblings 0.147 0.177 0.083 0.081 0.149
Spouse a U.S. migrant 0.010 0.011 0.006 0.005 0.001
U.S. migrant children 0.062 0.055 0.030 0.022 0.017
Social capital index 0.231 0.235 0.108 0.098 0.149
Community social capital
Percent migrants in community 12.153 12.293 5.603 4.206 1.137
Individual human capital
Education 5.831 7.999 7.420 8.022 12.906
Years of labor force experience 12.895 11.562 14.087 14.368 13.917
Skilled occupation at home 0.076 0.105 0.150 0.159 0.248
Human capital index 0.366 0.404 0.470 0.492 0.638
Migration-specific human capital∗
Number of prior trips 1.476 0.792 0.674 0.522 0.046
Years of prior U.S. experience 4.777 6.441 6.740 4.322 1.855
Documentation attained 0.134 0.409 0.161 0.070 0.053
Physical capital
Land 0.139 0.102 0.065 0.114 0.030
Home 0.483 0.313 0.479 0.477 0.531
Business 0.128 0.128 0.233 0.188 0.163
Key control variables
First versus later trip
Took additional trip 0.191 0.054 0.027 0.083 0.053
Cost of migration
Distance to U.S. destination 2201.3 1621.2 2202.8 2960.3 4680.1
Control variables
Community Size
Metro area 0.286 0.223 0.108 0.464 0.721
Town or city 0.230 0.317 0.892 0.277 0.279
Rural village 0.485 0.460 0.000 0.259 0.000
Demographic background
Age 35.416 35.816 35.555 35.690 38.491
Married or in union 0.738 0.677 0.731 0.667 0.696
Number of children under 18 2.090 1.709 1.672 1.348 1.384
Period
Before 1980 0.376 0.310 0.274 0.268 0.323
1980–1989 0.302 0.284 0.265 0.269 0.261
1990–1995 0.169 0.214 0.202 0.197 0.191
After 1996 0.120 0.157 0.226 0.234 0.193
Person years 284,751 15,754 32,544 28,994 15,009
∗
Defined for those who took at least one trip.
capital drops markedly, reflecting the relative recency of U.S.
migration from these settings. In these countries, fewer than
1% of household heads reported having a migrant parent or
spouse, and only 2%-3% had migrant children. The most
frequent category for access to social capital was siblings.
Around 8%–14% of respondents reported having a sibling
who had been to the United States.
Access to community-level social capital—measured by
the proportion of U.S. migrants present in the community
during the average person year—generally follows the same
pattern. In general, the average Mexican and Dominican
subjects lived in a place in which 12% of the surrounding
community residents had been to the United States, followed
closely by Nicaragua at 6%. The percentage was markedly
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lower in Costa Rica and Peru, with values of 4% and 1%,
respectively.
In general, cross-national patterns with respect to human
capital endowments are opposite those observed for social
capital. At one extreme are Peruvians, who averaged 13
years of schooling, 14 years of labor force experience, and
a quarter of whom held skilled occupations (recall that
most of these respondents were from metropolitan Lima).
Skilled occupations were those classified as professional,
managerial, clerical, or skilled manual. At the other extreme
are Mexicans, with a mean education of only 6 years and
just 8% in skilled occupations, though labor force experience
was more extensive at 13 years. In between these two
extremes are Dominicans, Costa Ricans, and Nicaraguans,
who report average educations of 7-8 years, percentages of
skilled workers in the range of 10%–16%, and an average
time in the labor force of around 14 years.
The distribution of physical capital across countries is
less consistent. Home ownership is most common in Peru
at 53%, followed by Mexico, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica at
around 48% each, and least common in the Dominican
Republic at only 31%. In contrast, land ownership is most
frequent in Mexico at 14%, followed by Costa Rica at 11%,
the Dominican Republic at 10%, Nicaragua at 6%, and Peru
at 3%. Business ownership is most common in Nicaragua,
where nearly a quarter owned businesses, followed by Costa
Rica at 19%, Peru at 16%, and Mexico and the Dominican
Republic at about 13%.
6. Key Control Variables
Table 2 also shows certain variables that we propose as key
controls in our analysis of social and human capital effects
on the likelihood of migration. We first measure whether
the trip being predicted is an initial or later departure to
the United States. As expected, repeat migration is most
common among Mexicans, 19% of whom took more than
one trip, followed by Costa Ricans at 8%, Dominicans and
Peruvians at 5% and Nicaraguans at 3.5%. These figures
suggest differential access across countries to migration-
specific human capital, and this is precisely what we find.
Among those at risk of taking an additional trip, Mexicans
had the largest number of prior trips (1.4 on average),
followed by Dominicans (0.79), Nicaraguans (0.68), Costa
Ricans (0.52), and Peruvians (0.05). In terms of total
U.S. experience, however, Nicaraguans were greatest at 6.7
years and Peruvians least at 1.8 years, with Dominican
Republic, Mexico, and Costa Rica in between with 6.4, 4.7
and 4.2 years, respectively. Whereas circular migration is
quite common among Mexicans, long-term settlement is
characteristic of Costa Ricans and Peruvians.
We also find considerable heterogeneity between coun-
tries in terms of access to documentation on later trips. By
far the greatest access is enjoyed by Dominicans, who in
the early 1960s were granted privileged access to legal status
as part of an American plan to defuse political unrest in
the wake of the U.S. invasion [44]. This action later yielded
a migration stream composed disproportionately of legal
migrants [43]. Thus, among Dominicans contemplating an
additional U.S. trip, 41% had legal papers. Nicaraguans were
also given privileged access to documents by the Nicaraguan
Adjustment and Central American Relief Act because they
were fleeing a left-wing regime and their documentation rate
is consequently relatively high at 16%, even greater than
Mexico’s 13% despite the fact that its migration is muchmore
recent. Lacking either the political impetus of the Dominican
Republic and Nicaragua or the long migration history of
Mexico, Costa Ricans and Peruvians experience the least
access to documentation on later trips, with respective rates
of documentation of only 7% and 5%.
A second key control variable is the cost of migration,
which we proxy using the average distance between places
of origin and destination. Although Mexico shares a land
border with the United States, it does not display the lowest
average distance to the United States, a distinction that goes
to the Dominican Republic. Both Mexico and the United
States are geographically quite large and migrants come
from all over Mexico and go to all over the United States
(see [45]). For most migrants, moving to the United States
does not involve a simple trip across the border but a long
journey between distant points such as Puebla and New
York, Oaxaca and Chicago or Veracruz and Los Angeles.
In contrast, the Dominican Republic is a small, compact
country and migrants concentrate disproportionately at one
particular point of destination, New York City, which is
1,587 kilometers away, yielding an average distance of just
1,626 kilometers compared with an average distance of 2,203
kilometers for Mexicans.
Nicaragua is also a relatively small country whose
migrants concentrate in Miami, which is only 1,020 kilo-
meters distant from Managua, but a secondary node in Los
Angeles and significant settlements elsewhere produced a
higher average distance of 2,202 kilometers, the same as
Mexico. Although Costa Rica is next to Nicaragua and itself
a compact country, it sends migrants to a wider variety
of U.S. destinations, yielding an average distance of 2,960
kilometers. The most distant migrants obviously come from
Peru, which also sends to a variety of U.S. destinations but
with particular concentrations in New York and Los Angeles,
yielding an average distance of 4,680 kilometers.
7. Other Control Variables
Less important theoretically but nonetheless important
control in our analyses are community size, demographic
background, and period. We control for community size
by dividing samples into three categories: rural villages of
fewer than 2,500 inhabitants, small towns and cities up
to 50,000 inhabitants, and metropolitan areas containing
greater than 50,000 inhabitants. In terms of demographic
background, we control for age, marital status, and presence
of minor children in the household. To measure period we
divide person years into four broad categories: before 1980,
which corresponds to the final stage of import substitu-
tion industrialization in Latin America, 1980–1989, often
referred to by Latin Americans as “the lost decade” because
of the collapse of import substitution as a development
strategy and the widespread decline in real living standards,
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Table 3: Effects of different forms of capital on the probability that a male household head from five Latin American societies took a first
trip to the United States 1965-survey date.
Independent variables Mexico Dominican Republic Nicaragua Costa Rica Peru
Forms of capital
Individual social capital
Parent a U.S. migrant 0.580∗∗∗ 1.221∗∗ 1.900∗∗∗ 1.233∗∗ —
U.S. migrant siblings 0.875∗∗∗ 1.158∗∗∗ 1.538∗∗∗ 0.563∗ 1.015
Wife a U.S. migrant 0.697∗∗∗ 2.182∗∗∗ 1.961∗∗∗ 1.535∗∗ —
U.S. migrant children 0.399∗∗ — −0.420 0.381 —
Community social capital
Percent U.S. migrants 0.031∗∗∗ 0.012 0.055∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗ 0.290
Individual human capital
Education −0.035∗∗∗ 0.044 0.105∗∗∗ 0.034 −0.082
Years of LF experience 0.019∗∗∗ 0.012 0.012 0.062∗ −0.011
Skilled occupation −0.647∗∗∗ 0.309 −0.780∗ −0.470 0.620
Physical capital
Land −0.030 0.668 −0.312 −0.172 —
Home −0.143∗∗ −0.328 0.108 −0.191 −1.028
Business −0.446∗∗∗ −0.242 0.269 0.145 —
Control variables
Community size
Metro area −0.540∗∗∗ −0.010 −0.638+ −2.307∗∗∗ —
Demographic background
Age −0.045∗∗∗ 0.160 0.101 −0.165∗ 0.158
Age squared −0.0007∗∗∗ −0.003+ −0.0015+ 0.001 −0.001
Married or in union −0.066 −0.005 0.451 0.685∗∗ −0.058
No. children <18 0.0332∗∗ −0.029 −0.146+ −0.007 −0.668
Period
<1980 — — — — —
1980–1989 0.012 0.425 0.882∗∗ 0.452+ −0.554
1990–1995 -0.029 −0.242 −0.403 −0.33 0.113
1996+ 0.409∗∗∗ −0.967 −0.699 −1.343∗∗ −0.930
Intercept −2.866∗∗∗ −8.635∗∗∗ −9.323∗∗∗ −2.989∗∗ −10.65∗∗
Likelihood ratio 4,939.86∗∗∗ 68.27∗∗∗ 175.86∗∗∗ 271.32∗∗∗ 9.31
Somer’s D 0.596 0.593 0.568 0.677 0.139
Person years observed 284,751 15,754 32,544 28,994 15,009
1990–1995, during which neoliberal forms were being intro-
duced to many countries, and 1996 to the survey date, when
the consequences of neoliberal structural adjustment policies
were becoming evident. Mean values for all control variables
are given in Table 2.
8. Social Capital and First Migration:
Country-Specific Effects
Table 3 presents a discrete time event history analysis
undertaken to measure the influence of different forms of
capital on the probability of leaving on a first trip to the
United States from the five countries under consideration.
Individuals were followed year-by-year from their entry into
the labor force up to the first trip or survey date, whichever
came first. We predicted whether or not they undertook a
first U.S. trip in year t+1 from independent variables defined
in year t using a logit regression model, which yields a
discrete time event history analysis. In assessing results, we
generally focus on the effects of social capital, with ancillary
attention paid to human and less to physical capital.
The top panel shows estimated effects for our four
indicators of individual social capital on the likelihood of
taking a first trip the United States. These estimates offer the
first comparative analysis of social capital’s effects across a
broad sample of Latin American nations using comparable
methods and data. In general, findings provide strong
support for the theory of social capital. Given the small
sample size and the tiny share of subjects having a parent,
wife or child who had been to the United States in Peru, we
only estimate the effect of a migrant sibling for that country.
Among the remaining 15 coefficients, 13 are significant
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and positive, indicating that a social tie to someone with
migratory experience increases the odds of migrating to the
Untied States. Among the four non-significant effects, two
are in the expected direction and quite large, suggesting
that with larger samples they might also have attained
statistical significance. (We conducted this analysis in two
ways, once as shown in the table and also by counting up
the number of ties to relatives with U.S. experience regardless
of family relationship. Goodness of fit statistics indicated
greater variance explained by models considering the family
relationships separately than those using counts of ties, so we
focused interpretation on the former.)
Thus strong, positive social capital effects on initial out-
migration are by no means limited to Mexico but appear to
be general throughout Latin America. Considering only the
significant coefficients, as one moves from left to right in
the table—that is from fewer to greater costs of migration—
the absolute size of the social capital coefficients generally
increases, with a few exceptions. Moreover, Mexico is the
only country sharing a land border with the United States
and it generally displays the smallest country-specific social
capital coefficients. Broadly speaking, then, these results are
consistent with the hypothesis that social capital is more
important when the barriers to movement are high.
In addition and also consistent with prior research, our
indicator of community social capital (the prevalence of
migrants in the community) is strong and significant in three
cases: Mexico, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica. The insignificant
coefficients in the Dominican Republic and Peru probably
reflect the relatively urban nature of the samples, as Fussell
and Massey [29] have demonstrated that even in Mexico
community social capital is not significant in urban areas.
In Peru the prevalence of U.S. migration is also very low
and displays little variance, mitigating against finding a
significant effect.
Consistent with the proposition that human capital
effects are indeterminate under neoclassical theory, we
encounter considerable diversity in the size and direction of
effects for the various indicators of human capital. The effect
of education is negative and significant in Mexico, positive
and significant in Nicaragua and Costa Rica, and insignif-
icant in the Dominican Republic and Peru. Greater labor
force experience positively predicts migration in Mexico and
in Costa Rica but is not significantly related to migration in
the other countries. The only variable to show relatively con-
sistent effects is occupational skill. In three of the five cases,
the effect is negative and in two the effect is statistically sig-
nificant (though only marginally in the case of Costa Rica).
Finally, with respect to the effect of physical capital on
first migration, we find very few significant effects. In no
country does land ownership predict out-migration to the
United States, and only in Mexico does business ownership
do so. Home ownership is significantly related to the odds
of taking a first U.S. trip only in Mexico. The overall effects
are all negative, which is more consistent with predictions
derived from the new economics of labor migration than
from neoclassical economics. That is, households already
owning homes and businesses do not need to self-finance
their acquisition through international migration.
9. Social Capital and First Migration:
General Processes
The foregoing results from five nations generally provide
strong and consistent support for the centrality of migrant
networks and the importance of social capital in interna-
tional migration. Being connected to someone with prior
U.S. experience, and residing in a community where many
people have already been to the United States, appear
universally to increase the odds of undertaking a first U.S.
trip. We did, however, observe certain irregularities among
the coefficients, which in some cases did not conform to
hypotheses. We now address these divergences by pooling the
data for all countries to come up with a set of stable estimates
reflecting general processes of first migration, and then use
these data to estimate theoretically expected interactions
between the cost of migration and social capital.
Table 4 pools the data across countries and estimates
two models. The one shown in the left-hand columns
includes indicators of individual social capital, community
social capital, individual human capital, and physical capital
plus controls for community size, demographic background,
period, and country of origin, with Mexico serving as
the reference. The right-hand columns estimates the same
equation but adding the natural log of distance to the
U.S. as another control to serve a proxy for the costs of
migration.
The left-hand columns confirm that throughout Latin
America, leaving on a first trip to the United States is strongly
predicted by having a tie to someone with prior migratory
experience though the strength of the effect varies with the
nature of the tie. In general, having a migrant sibling is
most powerful in predicting out-migration to the United
States, with an estimated effect of 0.901, followed by having
a migrant wife and having migrant parent with respective
effects of 0.774 and 0.584. These effects are significantly
smaller than the effect of having a migrant sibling (P <
.05). Having a child with U.S. experience is least powerful
in predicting initial migration to the United States, and
the effect of 0.304 is significantly different from the effects
of having migrant siblings. The effect of community social
capital on first migration is also positive and robustly
significant. Other things equal, coming from a community
with a higher share of U.S. migrants strongly increases the
odds that someone will decide to undertake a first trip.
In terms of human capital, education and occupational
skill negatively predict initial out-migration to the United
States whereas years of labor force experience positively
predict it. As a general rule, therefore, migrants from Latin
America are negatively selected with respect to education
and skill. Those most likely to leave for the United States
are those with the least skill and education but the most
work experience. Without documents, education and skill
are unlikely to be rewarded in the U.S. labor market, whereas
a willingness to work hard, particularly in onerous jobs
that American natives avoid, is more likely to be rewarded
north of the border. Owning a home and business likewise
negatively predict initial out-migration, suggesting a general
pattern of negative selectivity with respect to physical capital.
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Table 4: Effects of different forms of capital on the probability that a male household head from five Latin American societies took a first
trip to the United.
Independent variables
No controls for distance Controlling for distance
B SE B SE
Forms of capital
Individual social capital
Parent a U.S. migrant 0.584∗ 0.045 0.594∗∗∗ 0.046
U.S. migrant siblings 0.901∗∗∗ 0.038 0.898∗∗∗ 0.038
Wife a U.S. migrant 0.774∗∗∗ 0.096 0.744∗∗∗ 0.097
U.S. migrant children 0.304∗ 0.120 0.308∗ 0.121
Community social capital
Prop. U.S. migrants in community 0.030∗∗∗ 0.001 0.030∗∗∗ 0.001
Individual human capital
Education −0.026∗∗∗ 0.004 −0.027∗∗∗ 0.005
Years of labor force experience 0.021∗∗∗ 0.005 0.022∗∗∗ 0.005
Skilled occupation at home −0.582∗∗∗ 0.085 −0.603∗∗∗ 0.087
Physical capital
Land −0.038 0.060 −0.044 0.061
Home −0.136∗∗ 0.043 −0.151∗∗∗ 0.043
Business −0.355∗∗∗ 0.065 −0.365∗∗∗ 0.066
Key control
Cost of migration
Natural log of distance to US — — −0.392∗∗∗ 0.052
Other controls
Community size
Metro area −0.569∗∗∗ 0.055 −0.692∗∗∗ 0.058
Town or city — — — —
Rural village 0.051 0.037 0.057 0.037
Country of origin
Mexico — — — —
Dominican republic −1.336∗∗∗ 0.144 −1.610∗∗∗ 0.158
Costa rica −0.306∗∗∗ 0.087 −0.229∗ 0.094
Nicaragua −0.997∗∗∗ 0.108 −1.051∗∗∗ 0.112
Peru −2.296∗∗∗ 0.410 −1.919∗∗∗ 0.413
Demographic background
Age −0.052∗∗∗ 0.012 −0.053 0.013
Age squared −0.001∗∗ 0.000 −0.0005∗∗ 0.000
Married or in consensual union −0.016 0.046 −0.006 0.046
Number of children under 18 0.022∗∗∗ 0.011 0.026∗ 0.011
Period
Before 1980 — — — —
1980–1989 0.036 0.040 0.026 0.040
1990–1995 −0.033 0.055 −0.050 0.056
After 1996 0.297∗∗∗ 0.067 0.304∗∗∗ 0.068
Intercept −2.926∗∗∗ 0.184 0.100 0.447
Likelihood ratio 6,004.88∗∗∗ 6,017.00∗∗∗
Somer’s D 0.626 0.629
Person years 377,052 376,957
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The demographic controls behave as one might expect.
Controlling for labor force experience, age has a negative
effect on the odds of taking a first U.S. trip, one that
accelerates as the years advance. Although being married
or in a union is positively related to the likelihood of
departure, the effects are not statistically significant; however,
the presence of children under age 18 is positively related
and statistically significant. The only period coefficient that
is significant is that corresponding the post-1996 period
when the effects of neoliberal restructuring reached their
apogee. The coefficients associated with country dummy
variables are strongly negative and highly significant. Given
that the reference category is Mexico, this result implies that
sharing a land border with the United States yields a higher
likelihood of first migration apart from other variables in
the model.
The right-hand columns show the effect of the foregoing
variables once the log of distance is included to control for
the relative cost of migration. As expected, distance has a
strong, negative, and highly significant effect on the odds
of taking a first trip to the United States. The farther one’s
community is from U.S. destinations, the less the likelihood
of leaving on a first trip. Despite this strong effect, however,
none of the other coefficients change in any meaningful
way as a result of controlling for distance. The fact that the
country coefficients do not change, in particular, suggests
that sharing a land border with the United States yields a
higher likelihood of first migration irrespective of the actual
distances involved.
In addition, the fact that the effects of individual and
community social capital do not change suggests that having
ties to U.S. migrants increases the likelihood of departure at
all distances. The latter finding, however, does not preclude
significant interactions with distance and, as hypothesized
above, we do not expect the migratory effects of social
capital to be same irrespective of cost. On the contrary,
we hypothesize that the effects of both individual and
community social capital will become more important as the
costs of international movement rise, a hypothesis we test in
the next section.
10. InteractiveModels of Social Capital
and First Migration
Table 5 shows the results of an equation estimated to capture
these interactions. As before, we pooled the data from
all countries and include distance to measure the cost of
migration, interacting it with indicators of human and social
capital. In order to avoid a proliferation of interaction terms,
we consolidated the separate indicators of individual social
and human capital into a summary index. Specifically, we
weighted each indicator with its corresponding coefficient
from Table 4 and added them together to created summated
ratings scale of individual human capital. In this way, each
component in the resulting index is weighted to reflect
its relative importance in predicting out-migration. We
repeated the same exercise to create a summated ratings scale
of individual human capital. Means for these indices are
shown in Table 2.
The left-hand equation estimates the model with main
effects only. As we would expect, individual and community
social capital continue to have very strong, positive, and
robust effects on the likelihood of leaving for the United
States. Both coefficients are more than 30 times their
standard errors. The human capital index has a strong and
significant negative effect on initial out-migration. The right-
hand equation includes terms for the hypothesized interac-
tions. The inclusion of interaction terms does not change the
effects of other variables in the model. In particular, Mexico
continues to have a much higher probability of initial out-
migration than other countries, suggesting once again that
sharing a land border with the United States increases the
odds of migration apart from social capital, distance, or any
interactions between them.
All of the interaction terms are statistically significant,
meaning that the effects of human and social capital are not
uniform but vary by distance from points of destination.
Inclusion of the interaction term between the individual
social capital index and distance produces a positive inter-
action and turns the main effect from positive to negative.
Inclusion of the interaction term between community-level
social capital and distance also maintains the main effect
positive but the interaction itself is negative. In the case of the
distance-human capital interaction, the main effect remains
negative and increases while the interaction term is positive.
It is difficult to see how the interaction plays out just
looking at the coefficients. In order to explore the theoretical
and practical implications of the interactions we generate
predicted probabilities of taking a first U.S. trip. Specifically,
we let the variables being interacted run from their minima
to maxima while holding all other variables constant at their
means and applying the coefficients estimated in Table 5.
The results of this exercise are plotted in Figure 1 through
Figure 4. In order to establish a baseline for interpretation,
Figure 1 graphs the main effects for individual social capital,
community social capital, and human capital using the
model shown in the left-hand columns of Table 5. Since
testing our hypothesis requires the inclusion of interaction
terms we present estimated coefficients instead of odds-
ratios for all our models to provide the reader with uniform
estimators (see [46]).
Over the observed range of each variable, we see that
individual social capital is most powerful in predicting the
likelihood of departing on a first trip to the United States,
raising the probability from near zero at its minimum to
0.040 at its maximum. The effect of community social capital
is moremodest, with the probability going from zero to 0.018
as the share of migrants goes from minimum to maximum.
Human capital has a small negative effect on the likelihood
of initiating U.S. migration, reducing the probability of
movement from 0.01 at its minimum to near zero at its
maximum. None of these predictions, however, takes into
account the significant interactions we detected in the model
shown on the right-hand side of Table 5.
Figure 2 illustrates what happens when the interaction
between individual social capital and distance is taken into
account. Here, we generate predicted probabilities of first
migration by letting the individual social capital index runs
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Table 5: Event history models of the probability that a male household head from five Latin American societies took a first trip to the United
States 1965-survey date.
Independent variables
Main effects only With interactions
B SE B SE
Forms of capital
Individual social capital
Social capital index 0.948∗∗∗ 0.031 −0.428 0.744
Community social capital
Prop. U.S. migrants in community 0.030∗∗∗ 0.001 0.187∗∗∗ 0.040
Individual human capital
Human capital index −0.799∗∗∗ 0.082 −10.302∗∗∗ 1.866
Physical capital
Land −0.049 0.061 −0.055 0.061
Home −0.120∗∗ 0.043 −0.115∗∗ 0.043
Business −0.358∗∗∗ 0.066 −0.371∗∗∗ 0.066
Key control
Cost of migration
Natural log of distance −0.383∗∗∗ 0.053 −0.514∗∗∗ 0.103
Interactions
Individual social capital × log distance — — 0.181+ 0.097
Prop. migrants × log distance — — −0.020∗∗∗ 0.005
Individual human capital × log distance — — 1.238∗∗∗ 0.242
Other controls
Community size
Metro area −0.713∗∗∗ 0.058 −0.704∗∗∗ 0.058
Town or city — — — —
Rural village 0.072+ 0.037 0.066+ 0.037
Country of origin
Mexico — — — —
Dominican republic −1.655∗∗∗ 0.157 −1.585∗∗∗ 0.159
Costa Rica −0.232∗ 0.093 −0.312∗∗ 0.095
Nicaragua −1.077∗∗∗ 0.111 −1.069∗∗∗ 0.112
Peru −2.007∗∗∗ 0.412 −2.353∗∗∗ 0.418
Demographic background
Age −0.004 0.011 −0.003 0.012
Age squared −0.001∗∗∗ 0.000 −0.001∗∗∗ 0.000
Married or in consensual union 0.0168 0.046 0.018 0.046
Number of children under 18 0.027∗ 0.011 0.026∗ 0.011
Period
Before 1980 — — — —
1980–1989 0.088∗ 0.039 0.098∗ 0.039
1990–1995 0.057 0.052 0.072 0.052
After 1996 0.448∗∗∗ 0.062 0.468∗∗∗ 0.062
Intercept −0.752+ 0.440 0.239 0.804
Likelihood ratio 5,917.27∗∗∗ 5,962.65∗∗∗
Somer’s D 0.626 0.627
Person years 376,957 376,957
from its minimum to maximum at seven different levels
of distance: the minimum observed distance, minus two
standard deviations below the mean, minus one standard
deviation, precisely at themean, plus one standard deviation,
plus two standard deviations, and at the maximum. At the
minimum distance—say a community in a Mexican border
state—access to individual social capital has virtually no
effect and the curve is flat. In this case, destinations are so
close and accessible that having ties to people with migrant
experience makes little difference in predicting the odds
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Figure 1: Main effects of individual social capital, general social
capital, individual human capital, and distance on the probability
of taking a first US trip.
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Figure 2: Interactive effect of individual social capital and distance
on the probability of taking a first U.S. trip.
of movement. As distance increases, however, the effect of
individual social capital becomes steadily more pronounced
and at the maximum distance, the swing is from 0.002 to
0.08 as social capital increases from minimum to maximum.
As hypothesized, therefore, access to individual social capital
in the form of direct ties to people with migrant experience
becomes increasingly important in predicting migration as
the costs of migration rise.
In contrast, as shown in Figure 3, the interaction between
community social capital and distance works in a different
way. In this case, as distance increases the effect of social
capital diminishes. At the minimum distance, shifting the
share of migrants in the community from its minimum
to maximum raises the probability of migration from 0 to
0.89, an effect so large we did not plot it. At two standard
deviations below the mean, increasing the share of migrants
in the community from its minimum to maximum raises the
probability from 0 to 0.2—still a large effect (see Figure 3). At
one standard deviation above the mean distance the swing
is only from 0 to 0.044 and at the mean distance it goes
from 0 to just 0.018. If we assume that community social
capital—the proportion of people in the community with
prior U.S. experience—indicates access to weak ties whereas
individual social capital (direct ties to specific people with
U.S. experience) indicates access to strong ties, then Figure 3
implies that weak ties are primarily important when the
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Figure 3: Interactive effect of general social capital and distance on
the probability of taking a first U.S. trip.
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Figure 4: Interactive effect of individual human capital and
distance on probability of taking a first U.S. trip.
cost of migration is low. In contrast, strong ties are most
important when the cost ofmigration is high. In other words,
weak ties become less important as the cost of migration
rises, even though they are very powerful when the costs
of migration are small, which explains why the effect of
community social capital is so strong in Mexico compared
with other countries (see Table 2).
The interaction between distance and human capital is
even more complex, with the direction of the effect changing
completely as distance moves from minimum to maximum
as shown in Figure 4. When distance is at its minimum,
reflecting the lowest cost ofmigration, the effect of increasing
human capital is negative going from about 0.018 at the
minimum to zero at the maximum. The negative effect of
human capital moderates, however, as distance increases
and at two standard deviations the curve is relatively flat.
At maximum distance, the relationship between human
capital and migration actually becomes positive, raising the
probability of departure from zero to 0.0124, explaining why
in Peru migrants are positively selected by education whereas
in Mexico they are negatively selected.
11. The Process of Repeat Migration
People who migrate to the United States return to their
communities of origin qualitatively changed. They have
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gained knowledge about the process of migration and
valuable experience in U.S. markets. Knowledge and skills
gained in the course of migration yields migration-specific
human capital, and research done in Mexico has shown it
promotes the taking of additional U.S. trips. Once someone
has lived and worked in the United States and returned
home, the probability is high that they will leave again—
much higher than the likelihood of taking a first trip [6]. In
Mexico, the odds of taking an additional U.S. trip generally
rise with each trip taken, a process that yields a pattern
of recurrent circular migration [47, 48]. In addition, the
likelihood of another trip also increases with the cumulative
amount of time spent in the United States [8].
In Table 6, we show results for two models estimated
to predict the likelihood of taking an additional U.S. trip,
adding to the independent variables considered before our
three indicators migration-specific human capital: number
of prior trips, cumulative U.S. experience, and possession of
documents. The left-hand columns show a model estimated
for main effects only, whereas the right-hand columns
show a model that includes capital-distance interactions. As
expected, indicators of migration-specific human capital are
all highly significant in predicting repeat migration to the
United States.
Considering the main effects in the left-hand columns,
we see that as in Mexico, the odds of taking another
trip rise with each trip taken and are, not surprisingly,
dramatically increased by the possession of legal documents.
Unlike in Mexico, however, the effect of cumulative U.S.
experience is strong and negative. Recurrent migration is
relatively common in Mexico, of course, and migrants
often accumulate large amounts of U.S. experience across
multiple trips, so both trips and experience end up positively
predicting the taking of additional trips. In other countries,
however, recurrent migration is uncommon, and migrants
more frequently adopt a settled strategy, remaining in the
United States for long durations before returning home. The
general pattern, therefore, is that U.S. experience negatively
predicts the odds of going again. Mexico is the exception
and not the rule. In general, a large number of prior trips
indicates that the migrant—whether Mexican or not—has
established a pattern of recurrent movement back and forth
and is likely to migrate again, but a long duration of time
spent in the U.S. suggests that the migrant has established a
pattern of settled migration and is less likely to go again.
As hypothesized, social capital is less powerful in predict-
ing later as opposed to initial trips, which can be seen by
comparing the main effect models in Tables 5 and 6. Moving
from first to later trips, the coefficient for community social
capital drops from 0.030 to 0.012 and the coefficient for
individual social capital not only drops in value but changes
sign, going from 0.948 to −0.098. Once people have been to
the United States, whether they go again has much more to
do with their own experiences in the U.S. than with their
social connections to other migrants.
As with initial trips, however, the right-hand columns
indicate that capital-cost interactions are significant though
in this case all themain effects are positive and the interaction
terms are all negative. What this pattern means is illustrated
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
P
ro
ba
bi
lit
y
Minimum Maximum social capitalsocial capital
Minimum distanceMaximum distance
+2 SD
+1 SD −2 SD
−1SD
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in Figure 5, which plots the effect of individual social capital
on the likelihood of repeat migration at different levels of
distance. When distances are small and the cost of migration
presumably low, the relationship between individual social
capital and high parity migration is positive: more social
capital increases the odds of taking another trip. At the
minimum observed distance, for example, the likelihood
of taking an additional trip rise from just under 0.03
with minimum individual social capital to nearly 0.12 at
maximum social capital. In contrast, when distance is great
and the cost of migration high, the relationship between
individual social capital and repeat migration is negative:
more social capital reduces the odds of leaving again. At
the maximum observed distance, as individual social capital
moves from its minimum to maximum, the probability of
taking another trip falls from 0.12 to just under 0.05. In
other words, when one is far away, having other migrants
in the family apparently reduces the odds of moving again,
possibly because family members act as substitutes rather
than complements to an individual’s movement in the face
of high costs.
Figure 6 plots the interaction between distance and
community social capital, and here, just as in the model for
first trips, we encounter the opposite pattern: at minimum
distance (low cost) community social capital has a small
negative effect on the odds of taking another grip, whereas
at maximum distance (high cost) community social capital
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Table 6: Event history models of the probability that a male household head from five Latin American societies took an additional trip to
the United States 1965-survey date.
Independent variables
Main effects only With interactions
B SE B SE
Forms of capital
Individual social capital
Social capital index −0.098∗∗∗ 0.018 1.581∗∗∗ 0.377
Community social capital
Prop. U.S. migrants in community 0.012∗∗∗ 0.001 0.104∗∗∗ 0.028
Individual human capital
Human capital index −0.006∗∗∗ 0.001 0.073∗ 0.035
Migration specific human capital
Prior U.S. experience −0.176∗∗∗ 0.004 −0.175∗∗∗ 0.004
Number of prior U.S. trips 0.662∗∗∗ 0.008 0.663∗∗∗ 0.008
Documented 0.552∗∗∗ 0.040 0.547∗∗∗ 0.041
Physical capital
Land 0.102∗∗ 0.034 0.104∗∗ 0.034
Home 0.064∗ 0.027 0.070∗ 0.027
Business −0.166∗∗∗ 0.039 −0.168∗∗∗ 0.039
Key control
Cost of migration
Natural log of distance −0.055 0.037 0.349∗∗∗ 0.080
Interactions
Individual social capital × log distance — — −0.218∗∗∗ 0.049
Prop. migrants × log distance — — −0.012∗∗ 0.004
Individual human capital × log distance — — −0.010∗ 0.004
Other controls
Community size
Metro area −0.460∗∗∗ 0.050 −0.440∗∗∗ 0.050
Town or city — — — —
Rural village 0.084∗∗ 0.027 0.090∗∗∗ 0.027
Country of origin
Mexico — — — —
Dominican republic −0.669∗∗∗ 0.178 −0.665∗∗∗ 0.178
Costa rica −0.239∗∗ 0.090 −0.304∗∗∗ 0.091
Nicaragua −0.982∗∗∗ 0.178 −1.001∗∗∗ 0.178
Peru 0.421 0.429 0.059 0.434
Demographic background
Age −0.051∗∗∗ 0.008 −0.050∗∗∗ 0.008
Age squared −0.00001 0.000 −0.00002 0.000
Married or in consensual union 0.251∗∗∗ 0.036 0.250∗∗∗ 0.036
Number of children under 18 0.004 0.007 0.003 0.007
Period
Before 1980 — — — —
1980–1989 0.101∗∗∗ 0.030 0.104∗∗∗ 0.030
1990–1995 −0.102∗∗ 0.036 −0.105∗∗ 0.036
After 1996 0.082+ 0.042 0.088∗ 0.042
Intercept −0.176 0.320 −3.304∗∗∗ 0.634
Likelihood ratio 25,289.31∗∗∗ 25,340.73∗∗∗
Somer’s D 0.742 0.743
Person years 76,275 76,275
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has a rather large positive effect on the likelihood of repeat
migration. Thus, at the minimum observed distance, the
swing in migration probabilities is from 0.11 to 0.06 as
community social capital goes from minimum to maximum,
whereas at the maximum observe distance the swing is from
0.03 to 0.43. Being in a community with a large number of
fellow migrants thus plays a much more important role in
promoting repeat migration when it is far from the United
States than when it is near.
Although the interaction between human capital and
distance is significant statistically, coefficients associated with
both the main effects and the interaction term are so small
as to have no substantive effect. Human capital ends up
having amarginal effect on the likelihood of repeat migration
at all distances and is thus not plotted. Selection into the
pool of repeat migrants is thus on the basis of social capital
and migration specific human capital, with quite different
patterns prevailing in countries at different distances from
U.S. destinations. In particular, where the costs of migration
are low, as in Mexico community social capital increases the
odds of taking another trip, but when they are high, as in
Peru, social capital reduces the odds of repeat migration.
12. Conclusions
In this analysis, we combined data from the Latin American
Migration Project and the Mexican Migration Project to
study the effects of different forms of capital on processes
of international migration to the United States from Mexico,
the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Peru.
We estimated discrete-time event history models to predict
the odds of taking first and subsequent trips to the United
States in order to determine whether network connections
and the social capital they yield operate similarly to promote
migration across settings. We considered measures of both
individual and community level social capital, measuring
strong and weak ties, and specified several interactions to
test specific hypotheses about how the effects of social capital
vary under conditions of low versus high costs of migration
and on first versus later trips.
We found that both individual social capital (measured
by having ties to specific kinds of people with U.S. migratory
experience) and community social capital (measured by the
relative proportion of migrants in the community) indeed
operate to promote and sustain international migration
in different national settings across Latin America. The
important role played by migrant networks in explaining
the likelihood of leaving on first trips to the United States
are not confined to Mexico, but occur in other migrant-
sending countries in the Western Hemisphere. Like other
studies, we found that a rising prevalence of migrants in
the community strongly increases the likelihood of out-
migration of others, thus confirming a key pathway in
the cumulative causation of migration. Among individual
indicators of social capital, having a sibling with prior
migrant experience has the strongest influence in predicting
out-migration to the United States, with ties to parents,
wives, and children having about half the effect of sibling
ties. Nonetheless, the individual effects are all significant
and, in general, the more connections one has to people
with U.S. experience, the greater the odds of leaving on an
initial U.S. trip, an effect strongly confirmed by the combined
index of individual human capital we developed to estimate
interactive models.
Despite the apparent universality of social capital effects
across Latin America, however, the relative power of social
capital in determining international migration is not uni-
form across settings. The size of individual social capital
effects varies with the cost of migration, as measured by
distance from U.S. destinations, and between first and later
trips. Strong ties (direct connections to people with migrant
experience) generally become more powerful in predicting
first migration as distance increases, whereas weak ties
(measured by the overall prevalence of migrants in the
community) become less powerful in predicting migration
as distance rises.
We also found that the decision calculus changes for first
and later trips. In contemplating an initial trip, people do not
have access to migration-specific human capital (knowledge
and experience gained through migration itself) and rely
heavily on social capital (weak and strong ties to people
with U.S. experience) to support and sustain international
movement. The effect of social capital in predicting later trips
depends, however, on distance from U.S. destinations. In
both cases, social capital is negatively related to the likelihood
of taking an additional trip at long distances but positively
related at short distances. Both weak and strong ties have
progressively stronger and more positive effects in predicting
additional trips as the cost of migration drops.
In addition to significant interactions between cost and
social capital, we also found a strong interaction between
cost and human capital (education, experience, and skill)
in predicting first trips, such that the direction of human
capital’s effect was reversed when moving from short to long
distances. At short distances where the cost of migration is
low, the likelihood of taking a first U.S. trip is negatively
related to human capital but at long distances with high
cost it is positively related. Although the interaction between
education and distance is also statistically significant in
predicting later trips, in substantive terms the effect is trivial
and migrants do not appear to be selected into a repeat
migration on the basis of skill and education.
These findings underscore the importance of undertak-
ing comparative analyses in trying to understand how social
capital affects migration. Prior work has established many
seemingly “hard” findings about how social capital works to
promote international movement, but the research to date
has been disproportionately on Mexico, which is inevitably a
special case given its shared border with the United States.
Our results suggest that even after controlling for social
capital, human capital, and distance, the odds of taking
first and later trips are greater when two countries share a
border. Moreover, distance itself conditions the nature and
direction of many effects, implying that certain seemingly
hard findings based on research done in Mexico may reflect
its unique circumstances rather than general processes. For
example, whereas in Mexico the odds of taking an additional
trip rise with each trip taken and each year of U.S. experience,
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the more general finding is that the likelihood of repeat
migration rise with the number of trips but fall with
total experience. Given its shared border, Mexico is unique
in being able to sustain widespread recurrent migration,
whereas migrants in other countries are compelled to adopt
long-term settlement as the preferred strategy.
Likewise, although migrants in Mexico are well known
to be negatively selected on the basis of human capital traits
such as skills and education, our results suggest this pattern
is at least in part explained by how human capital interacts
with distance. On initial trips, in particular, the relationship
between human capital and migration is negative at short
distances (as in Mexico) but positive at long distances (as
in Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Peru). Similarly, research
in Mexico has shown that community social capital—the
proportion of migrants in the community—is powerful in
predicting the likelihood of both initial and subsequent
out-migration, but the interactions reveal that this effect is
largely a result of Mexico’s proximity to the United States,
and that the positive effect of community social capital
diminishes sharply as the cost of migration rises. In contrast,
the strong effect individual social capital has in predicting
first trips from Mexico is even stronger in other, more
distant countries. In contrast, the strong effect of individual
social capital in predicting additional trips among Mexicans
is actually reversed and becomes negative among migrants
from countries that are distant from the United States.
These analyses broaden the base of generalization for
the theory of social capital and extend the applicability of
migrant network effects to new settings. We have docu-
mented the existence of such networks and the importance
of the social capital they yield in determining migration from
a variety of different settings in the Americas and have shown
how certain variations in context such as the relative cost
of migration can amplify or reduce the basic migration-
enhancing effects of social capital. As additional data from
other countries become available through the Latin Ameri-
canMigration Project and newer projects ongoing in Poland,
Africa, and China, we hope to continue to expand the basis
for empirical and theoretical generalization.
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